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The series of terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, sent
the world into a state of shock.  Representative great powers in Europe such as Great
Britain, Germany and France were quick to promise their support of the United States
in their proclaimed campaign against terror; so were Russia and China.1) As for
Japan, its hurried expression of its willingness to support the US helped to recall
Japan’s slow motion reaction in the Gulf Crisis, making Japan’s prompt measures
seem like an attempt to avoid repeating the same mistakes.2) Immediately after the
attacks in New York and Washington, the Japanese prime minister extended his
“heartfelt sympathies” to the American people, characterizing the events of the
previous day as “extremely vicious and unforgivable acts of violence.”  Koizumi also
described the attacks as a serious challenge not only to the United States, but also to
“international society.”
On September 19 Koizumi declared that Japan would “promptly take measures
necessary for the dispatching of the Self-Defence Forces for providing support … to
the US forces.”  On October 29 the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was passed.
On November 9 two destroyers and a supply ship departed for the Indian Ocean,
which were charged with transporting and supplying fuel for American ships, the
transportation of personnel and goods, repair and maintenance, medical activities,
and providing seaport services.  In retrospect, Japan’s response to September 11 was
comparatively rapid and effective.3)
On innumerable occasions Japan’s lingering fear of being marginalized by the
international community for its reluctance to make a non-financial contribution and
depart from its much-maligned “checkbook diplomacy” has become evident.  Apart
from this very strong incentive to maintain its international reputation, Japan has
experienced an intensifying debate on redefining its international contribution, more
specifically about the legitimacy of sending Japanese self-defence forces abroad for
combat purposes for the first time since World War II.
There is no doubt that the 2001 attacks have brought new momentum into the
staggering debate about constitutional revision and more broadly, the redefinition of
Japan’s international contribution as such, which in turn is inseparably connected with
Japan’s identity in international politics.  The attacks have also increased awareness in
the Japanese government as well as among the Japanese people that the country may
be insufficiently prepared for a potential terrorist attack.  As is commonly known,
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution “renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the
173
Reconstructing Japan’s International
Contribution in the Post-September 11 World:
Evaluating Implications for Japan’s 
National Security Debate
Susanne Klien
nation and the threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”
According to a poll carried out for the Yomiuri Shinbun in April 2006 over half of those
asked said that they favored changing the constitution in order to permit Japan to play
a greater international role.4) The Japanese public has started to support the idea of
dispatching Japanese self-defence forces abroad, gradually realizing the transnational
nature of security.5) This debate has also made evident the great gap between public
opinion and national legislation.  This gap has been added to by Prime Minister
Koizumi’s ambiguous attitude towards key concepts such as “collective self-defence,”
“有事 yu¯ji” (contingency) or “areas surrounding Japan.” 6) Former United States
Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage pointed out that Japan’s self-
confidence has increased more and more, remarking that in the Araki Report by the
Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (Koizumi’s private advisory council on
matters relating to security and defence chaired by Araki Hiroshi) one can see clearly
that with the progress of the discussion on national security policies, Japan has come
to assert itself more than ever before.7) The crux of the Araki report is a call for the
self-defense forces (SDF) to take part in anti-terror wars waged by the Bush
administration unlimitedly.  It also urges that new mechanisms be established with the
aim of permitting the SDF to be dispatched overseas.
Retrospectively, one can well say that the terrorist attacks have, to some degree at
least, diverted public attention from the deepening national economic recession and
financial issues.  The worsening state of the national economy, in turn, has enforced
the sense of national frustration, despair and pessimism, the background being that
economic growth used to be synonymous with Japan’s identity.  Some conservative
politicians have tried to turn this frustration into support for initiatives that aim to
provide Japan with a renewed sense of self-confidence by enlarging its international
contribution.  This brings us to one of the salient paradigms of Japanese postwar
foreign policy, which DiFilippo called “post-Occupation syndrome” or Japan’s 
(over-)reliance on the United States in security matters; this has led to extreme
complaisance with Washington on the part of Tokyo (対米配慮 taibei hairyo—
consideration toward the United States).8)
As the terms “identity,” “self-perception,” “national discourse” and the title of this
paper have indicated, my theoretical tenets draw on constructivism.  Apart from the
fact that the definition of constructivism per se has been controversial,9) to say the least,
in the last few years international relations theory has seen the emergence of “critical”
constructivism in addition to “conventional” constructivism.10) I regard this school of
thought as a useful method to supplement the heritage of systemic approaches in
international relations theory.  In this sense, I prioritise non-material elements such as
norms, values or ideas, but simultaneously take material elements into consideration.
In other words, I share Katzenstein’s and Okawara’s view that “analytical eclecticism”
is most appropriate in the case of Japan: “With specific reference to Japanese and
Asian-Pacific security affairs, this article argues against the privileging of parsimony
that has become the hallmark of paradigmatic debates.  The complex links between
power, interest, and norms defy analytical capture by any one paradigm.  They are
made more intelligible by drawing selectively on different paradigms—that is, by
analytical eclecticism, not parsimony.” 11) Katzenstein and Okawara go on to argue
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that “strict formulations of realism, liberalism, and constructivism sacrifice
explanatory power in the interest of analytical purity.  Yet in understanding political
problems, we typically need to weigh the causal importance of different types of
factors, for example, material and ideal, international and domestic.  Eclectic
theorizing, not the insistence on received paradigms, help us understand inherently
complex social and political processes.” 12)
A number of scholars have spent much time and effort on the question of which
theoretical approach is most appropriate for the analysis of Japan.13) Postwar Japan
has seemed to constitute a counter model to Realist approaches.  Thus it comes as a
surprise that only in recent years the number of scholars has grown who argue that
Japan cannot be analysed sufficiently and satisfactorily by applying theoretical
frameworks that prioritise material paradigms, such as neo-realism or neo-liberalism.
Some scholars even go as far as to claim that “Japan’s foreign policy provides perhaps
the strongest evidence to date that balancing is not occurring in Asia as realist theories
would predict.  For the past twenty years, realists have consistently predicted that
Japan would rearm, or at least become increasingly assertive in parallel with its
growing economic power, but it has not.  Although Japan is very powerful, it has not
yet adopted the trappings of a great power.” 14)
The insufficient explanatory potential of traditional theoretical frameworks is
particularly salient in the case of security studies on Japan since the end of the Cold
War.  Katzenstein argues for a new way that leaves behind both traditionally Realist
approaches as well as orthodox cultural theories.  He argues that “culture” is not an
efficient analytical instrument for empirical research, but instead proposes to focus
one’s analysis on selected aspects of culture, such as social or legal norms.15) One of
the greatest flaws that have been pointed out in purely cultural approaches has been
the difficulty of offering precise and clear definitions of key concepts such as “culture,”
“norm” and the like.16) Providing systematic variables, however, is the precondition of
meaningful analysis in the social sciences.  Why then should we bother at all with
cultural theory when exploring topics such as security?  If we look back on history,
the importance of cultural considerations in security studies has not been openly
admitted, but has surfaced time and again.  During World War II, for example, the
US Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the Office of War Information hired a
considerable number of cultural anthropologists to study the “national character” of
the Axis powers, specifically Germany and Japan, the most famous being Ruth
Benedict in the Japanese context.17) During the Cold War tensions between the US
and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 80s, the relation between strategy and culture
was again pointed out, this time by American security specialists.  And finally, the end
of the Cold War led to the emergence of renewed interest in culturally oriented
frameworks for the purposes of security studies.  Against this background, it does not
really come as a surprise that in the course of the last few years, constructivism has left
deep traces in international relations theory, particularly security studies.
In this paper I will give a survey of Japan’s reactions to the terrorist attacks on the
United States between 2001 and 2005, outlining the implications of the attacks on
Japan’s national security debate.  In line with the Constructivist hermeneutic
approach of discourse analysis,18) I will focus on contributions by politicians and
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scholars of varied political colouring that have been published in the popular Japanese
journals Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ron, Sekai and Shokun!.19) I will then evaluate how the Japanese
discourse on national security and Japan’s international contribution has been affected
by the attacks and assess how the different schools of thought (Independentists,
Centrists, Pacifists, Pragmatic Multilateralists) that evolved in the course of the 1990s
in Japan have developed in the wake of the attacks, how their respective notions of
national security have changed.  The methodology will thus consist of a systemic
qualitative analysis of the national debate concerning Japan’s international
contribution on the basis of selected Japanese journals published between September
2001 and September 2005.20) The ultimate aim of this paper is to evaluate how the
terrorist attacks have affected Japan’s definition of its international contribution in
politics, specifically seen against the phenomenon of its fading identity as a
mercantilist power and what implications this has had on Japan’s perception of itself.
Since Constructivists such as Kratochwil or Onuf maintain that discourses are
productive of things that are defined by this discourse and that these things can be
changed by intersubjective exchange,21) I will make an attempt to relate the national
discourse to Japan’s self-perception.  By elucidating the key ideas and norms of each
school of thought I hope to present a clear picture of the collective identity of each
group and thereby make a contribution to “reconstructing” Japan’s self-perception
and international role at the start of the 21st century.  As to the difference between
“norm” and “idea,” “norms” evidently make committal claims on individuals and
therefore exceed the purely cognitive nature of the concept of “idea.” 22) The concept
of “identity” has been inherent in every discussion that deals with Japan’s relation to
the rest of the world.  Due to the evident link between national identity and national
security perception I believe that an assessment of Japan’s recent national security
perception is meaningless without relating it to Japan’s identity or self-perception.
One more feature that has surfaced in the work of some constructivist scholars is
the assumption—which is in accordance with the overall ontology of mutual
constitution and interaction between agents and structures—that collective identity at
the national level is to a considerable degree influenced and shaped constitutively by
factors related to the international level.23) This differs strongly from the Realist
assumption that states are constrained by international society, but ultimately not
changed constitutively.  In this study I will show the influence external factors, more
specifically international society, have had on Japanese thought relating to national
security and strategy.24)
Analysing the implications of September 11 on Japan’s national security
debate between September 2001 and September 2005
Since the late 1990s Japan’s national debate on security issues has shown a growing
tendency to focus on strategic threats in Japan’s immediate neighbourhood: the
“Taiwan Crisis” in 1995, unsettled territorial disputes with South Korea about the
Takeshima Islands, with China about the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and with Russia
about the Kuriles, North Korea’s test-fire of a Taepodong I missile over Japanese
airspace in 1998, several incidents of “fushinsen” or “mystery ships” invading Japanese
waters and finally the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 have all
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contributed to awareness in Japan that traditional concepts of national security, above
all the “free rider” concept of military reliance on the United States, may not be
appropriate any longer.  Therefore it does not come as a surprise that the debate
about revising Japan’s constitution, particularly Article 9, has already started years
ago.  September 11 has certainly brought new momentum into this debate.  Left-
wingers even go so far as to claim that for conservatives, the terrorist attacks on the
United States have come as a long-awaited opportunity to push through legislation to
legitimize an expansion of the rights and responsibilities of Japan’s SDF.  Right-
wingers in turn have pointed to the humanitarian cause and Japan’s “international
contribution” when facing criticism that they have been trying to bring Japan back on
the path of militarist power.
Centrists (現状維持主義者)
“Good old days” versus need for change
Growing insecurity both in international politics and in Japanese domestic politics
have lessened the appeal of typically Centrist values such as continuity, permanence
and stability.  Due to growing flux in security matters as well as the steadily worsening
state of the Japanese economy and increasing concern about Japan’s financial system,
the Japanese national debate has seen the emergence of a distinct sense of urgency
about the need for reform in a wide range of fields over the last few years.  Morimoto
Satoshi, professor of international development at Takushoku University, points out
that a sense of change is in the air; in more concrete terms, the Japanese public is
becoming increasingly aware of the need to revise the constitution.25) The ambiguous
Centrist view of the constitutional issue is perhaps most typically embodied by Saito¯
Tamaki, who points out the urgency of the constitutional issue, but argues that Article
9 continues to be valid, thus calling for keeping the constitution as it is.  At the same
time, however, Saito¯ remarks that maintaining Article 9 would imply that one could
not come up with a straightforward sense of crisis.26) It is evident that the Centrist
view is inherently inconsistent: on the one hand they consider a dispatch of the SDF
as feasible without a constitutional revision, on the other hand they argue that the
constitution should be left as it is, adding that this condition would keep the Japanese
from developing a mature sense of participation in security issues.
Kamiya Matake, assistant professor at the Defense University, urges that the use of
the SDF must not be seen as a taboo.27) He considers it important that in order to
protect the “open society” which has continuously been cultivated in post-war Japan,
from terror, the role of the SDF should not be too big on the one hand.  On the other
hand, it is essential to call for a more active participation of the SDF in matters that
are judged to be manageable only for military organizations.28)
Noda Nobuo, professor at Nanzan University, claims that on the question whether
Japan should position itself pro or contra the United States, the only way for Japan is
to pursue anti-Americanism while maintaining a line which is thoroughly pro-United
States.29) This claim shows the extent to which the inner-Japanese discourse has been
fixated on the United States.  Similarly, the remark by Ogawa Kazuhisa, analyst of
military affairs, that if Japan goes to Iraq, it should not be for the sake of the United
States, but for its own sake, demonstrates the scope of Japan’s dependence on the
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United States.30) Saito¯ Tamaki argues that “due to the coupling of Article 9 and the
U.S.-Japan alliance, the Japanese consciousness is being broken up.  ‘The World’ is
synonymous with the United States, and there is no need for us to think of the world
in a real sense beyond that.  This is because all true contacts with the world need to be
approved by the United States and such circumstances deprive Japan of the chance to
practically maintain contacts with the world of its own accord.  In this way, our
interest inevitably turns towards the inside.” 31)
Nakanishi Hiroshi, professor of international politics at Kyoto University, agrees
that the bilateral alliance constitutes the heart of Japanese security policy, but he also
emphasizes that finding the right balance between the danger of entrapment and
abandonment is an issue of great importance to Japan.32) Nakanishi pleads for Japan
enforcing its diplomatic engagement for regional peace and stability more actively
than before.  He argues that if Japan itself adopts a political, military and economic
role as a power guaranteeing regional stability, this would reduce the situations in
which Japan needs to rely on U.S. military force, and at the same time this would raise
Japan’s value for the United States, reducing the risk of abandonment by the United
States.33)
Ambiguity as strategy
Since Centrists commonly combine Realism-tinted views with latent awareness of
the need for change, they tend to opt for ambiguity as a long-term strategy.  Former
Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, for example, suggests that
“… in order to make the Japanese-US alliance more effective, if Japan’s support is
required, the right of collective self-defence should be taken into consideration as a
logical extension of the right of individual self-defence.  I think that if the activities
of the United States troops are related to a direct threat to Japan’s national security,
dispatching JSDFs to support the US troops can only be justified.  This does not
require the revision of Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution.  The Japanese government
only needs to make clear its interpretation of the right of collective self-defence in
relation with Article 9.” 34)
The Centrist debate after the terrorist attacks shows a considerable amount of
ambiguity about whether these attacks can be seen as “war” as defined by
international law.  According to Miyazawa,
“In the case of America, since the Pentagon was targeted, the attacks can be seen as
a war action.  And as regards the fact how this matter should be tackled, the United
States who were the victim of these attacks, will be leading the campaign, but since
Japanese fellowmen were also affected, I think it natural for Japan to join in the
United States campaign.  However, strictly speaking, Japan is not cooperating to
carry out a war.  It is only trying to help in the prevention of international crimes or
in the punishment of those who committed those crimes.  If one does not think of
“war” and “activities to prevent crimes” in separate terms, there will soon be
emotional reactions such as ‘Aren’t the SDFs going to war?’ and a debate will be
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started about whether this is good or bad.” 35)
Since Centrists, however, do admit the need for change, they are forced to ensure a
minimum of clarity in their arguments lest they lose their credibility.  On the other
hand, they tend to be reluctant to take on responsibility, as the following remark
shows, even if it was meant as a kind of joke,
“The United States put so much pressure on Japan to join it in the Gulf War, but
this time all the US said to Japan was ‘Do what you can, that’s OK.’  I think that at
the bottom of its heart, Japan was really relieved about that (smiles).” 36)
The other side of the coin, however, is that Centrists feel that in a world of ever
growing complexity in international politics, Japan will risk losing international
competitiveness, if it is not willing to pursue its foreign relations on the basis of its own
set of priorities determined by national particularities.37) In the same vein, despite
their genuine aversion to anything that might jeopardize their values of “continuity”
and “stability,” Centrists have recently developed a distinct awareness of the need to
take risks in order to be globally competitive and, above all, to remain a respected
member of the international community.
The looming pessimism in the Centrist debate may be due to the fact that this
group is faced with the dilemma of increasing urgency to reform on the one hand and
their instinctive reluctance to change.  The serious condition of the Japanese economy
on the one side and the increasing number of threats to Japan’s national security on
the other have, however, led to the emergence of some willingness among Centrists to
reconsider some of their traditional values, as shown above.  They criticize Japan’s
“honeyed internationalism” as well as its simple-minded and naïve nationalism.38)
While this group would like to embrace change, its advocates have taken the passive
stance that Japan cannot do much by itself: “[Since Japan cannot achieve much by
itself ] Japan needs to take measures together with the United States.  While both states
maintain a complementary relationship, they become one unit and will be capable of
pursuing a strategy of balancing against China.” 39) Okazaki Hisahiko even claims that
“strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance is everything.” 40) He goes so far as to state that
with regard to the question of how Japan should handle China, it is not economics,
but politics which matters and “politics [for Japan] is the bilateral alliance with the
United States.” 41) Okazaki argues that joining Japan’s and U.S. military force would
mean being invincible under the sun.  He states that “it is extremely difficult to predict
Asia’s future [in terms of security], to know what will become of China, the Taiwan
straits, the Korean Peninsula, Russia.  In other words, we are faced with a multi-plane
equation with many independent variables.  However, it is in fact easy to solve it.
This is because among the many independent variables the value of the Japan-U.S.
alliance is overwhelmingly great.” 42)
Independentists (独立主義者)
The Independentist group stands for thinking in the classic Hobbesian tradition,
“the national interest” being regarded as one of the key concepts.  Other predominant
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features include explicit anti-Americanism, anti-pacifism and unease about Japan’s
oversensitivity and subservience to the United States in general.  Throughout the
1990s, zero-sum game thinking was prevalent in the Independentist debate.  Key
terms include “self-assertion” and “breaking out of the asymmetrical relationship with
the United States,” to name just a few.
Fear of being targeted by terrorism
One of the main concerns expressed by Independentists in the wake of the terrorist
attacks on the United States has been their worry about Japan’s exposure to future
terrorist attacks since it is a close ally.43) Nakanishi Terumasa rightly observes that
terror strikes everywhere in the world including Japan.  He claims somewhat
melodramatically that Japan as well as the world is a battle zone.44)
According to former Prime Minister Nakasone, due to its high population density
and urbanization, Japan can be considered as an easy target for such attacks.45)
Nakasone continues to argue that he thinks it natural that against this background,
Japan has started to consider rethinking concepts such as the exercise of the right of
collective self-defence.
Japan’s support in anti-terrorism campaign as golden opportunity
Another predominant idea in the Independentist debate since September 11 has
been that the scope of Japan’s military support in the United States anti-terrorist
campaign could determine Japan’s future support of United States troops in
contingency cases.  In other words, Japan’s international contribution to the war in
Afghanistan is seen more as a chance than a burden (as it has been regarded among
Centrists).
“Japan is an ally of the United States and a partner in the Japan-US Security treaty.
Japan needs to use its knowledge it gained from the Gulf Crisis lesson and should
support the United States because even Powell has said that depending on Japan’s
extent of support this time, they will think about its future extent of support in
contingency cases.” 46)
This remark by former Head of the National Security Chamber in the Cabinet
Sassa Atsuyuki illustrates continuing Realist thought, measuring the world mostly in
terms of relative gains.  Against this background it does not come as a surprise that in
the Independentist debate, Japan’s international contribution is usually linked to the
contingency legislation and the exercise of the right of collective self-defence.  In
other words, for this group international cooperation is nothing but a means to pursue
the national interest, i.e. in their eyes to expand Japan’s military role.  A title of an
article that appeared in the monthly Shokun! last November illustrates this approach:
“Now is the time to show our flag!” 47) Surprisingly, Independentists tend to argue that
an immediate revision of Article 9 of the Constitution is not necessary; instead they
emphasise the urgency of revising the interpretation of the right of collective self-
defence so that it can be exercised rapidly.48) Similarly, they typically complain about
the fact that as soon as they bring up the issue of constitutional revision, there will be a
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strongly negative reaction.49)
Independentists typically consider Japan’s participation in the US anti-terrorism
campaign as a welcome opportunity for Japan to provide itself with the capability to
defend itself by its own means.
“With regard to Japan’s reaction, I believe that three points are important.  First, we
must respond to it as a danger to entire mankind, second, as most important ally of
the United States, Japan is obliged to support it since the United States has suffered
so much harm.  Third, I think this is also an important chance for Japan to equip
itself with the capabilities to defend itself by its own means, including the capability
to participate in the anti-terrorist campaign, and therefore it is natural for us to offer
our wholehearted cooperation.” 50)
Maehara Seiji, member of parliament in the lower house and former leader of the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), argues that now that Japan has become the second
largest economic power, it cannot leave its national security to someone else.51) He
pleads for an incremental approach to revising the constitution:
“Finally, there is more understanding now for the approach that we carry out
amendments according with the changing times in order to turn the constitution
into something better.” 52)
Fear of marginalisation due to pacifism
Another related argument of the Independentist group is that maintaining Japan’s
post-war pacifist line may bring about Japan’s marginalisation in the international
community.
“If Japan points to the limitations imposed by its ‘Pacifist Constitution’ and argues
that it cannot participate fully not only in the attack on Afghanistan, but also in the
entire planning of the war and in the international network against terrorism, Japan
will end up being ostracised, taking up only an insignificant role in the international
community.” 53)
The subtitle of an article in the journal Shokun! published in February 2004 claims
that “if Japan continues to adhere to its trauma of ‘peace constitution,’ Japan will end
up going down like a ‘sleeping lion.’” 54)
Ishihara Shintaro¯ refers to “Japan’s common sense, which has been constrained by
Article 9 of the peace constitution, not being valid [in other countries].55)
Unease about Japan’s lack of maturity versus the US
A recurring theme among Independentists is their concern about Japan’s
subservience to and dependence on the United States.  Nakanishi Terumasa puts it as
follows,
“Just as the minds of the followers to the Aum sect were controlled by the leader of
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the group Asahara Sho¯ko¯, postwar Japanese have fallen entirely for that thought
embodied by the ‘peace constitution.’  On top of that, mentally speaking they are
entirely dependent on the Japanese-U.S. alliance.  This is why the Japanese have
lost their habit to think seriously about military issues.” 56)
In the same vein, literary critic Fukuda Kazuya refers to Japan’s postwar pacifism as
an “ostrich’s peace,” implying that the Japanese tend to bury their heads in the sand
when faced with danger.57)
Saeki Keishi, professor at Kyoto University, argues that
“it is in the national interest to take a stance of cooperation with the United States.
However, if one does not hold an anti-American line as a basis, being aware of the
issue of ‘Americanized Japan’ as a precondition, we run the risk of being pulled into
this alliance relationship forever.  I believe that this danger is extremely big.” 58)
In Nakanishi Terumasa’s view,
“there is general agreement that the most important task Japan faces now is to
overcome the postwar pacifism, which still remains strong and which was a
mistake, to overcome so-called ‘postwar democratism.’  We can say that apart from
the fact that Japan should pursue its national interest in a healthy manner in the
21st century, this is an indispensable precondition.  Whom we have to fight as our
main enemy is not so much the United States, but those who try to foist postwar
values on future Japan.” 59)
Maehara Seiji raises the question what is wrong about protecting one’s country by
one’s own means.  He admits that
“it is certainly wrong to initiate a war, but in view of Japan’s national interest, one
also wonders whether it makes sense to be so passive about dispatching SDF
abroad.  It is the same with energy and food: security is not for free.” 60)
Maehara also indicates the need for Japan to break out of its asymmetrical
relationship with the United States,
“In line with its national interest Japan needs to shake itself free of the asymmetrical
and unequal relationship with the United States with Japan providing the bases and
financial means and the United States protecting Japan in order to seek a role as a
partner to the United States.  On this occasion, there is no getting away from
dealing with the issue of the right of collective self-defence.” 61)
Independentists generally do agree to Japan’s support of the United States anti-
terrorist campaign, but they also argue as follows,
“The only claim that I want to make is that if there were a reasonable politician
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who shifts from the traditional context, he would express his support for the United
States campaign on the one hand and would, at the same time, engage in
diplomatic activities, continuing to dispatch special envoys into Islamic areas and
carrying out his own independent diplomacy in general.  It is true that by
announcing its support for the United States, Japan has also become a target for
terrorism, but a method to prevent this will be envisaged.  However, the
intelligentsia surrounding Prime Minister Koizumi is so simple-minded that they
basically hold the view that they are pleased if they get praise from the United
States.  This is why the above-mentioned two-pronged diplomatic approach, a
mature European-style diplomacy, is not feasible in Japan’s case.” 62)
Fukuda Kazuya expresses his despair about Japan’s exaggerated sensitivity to
reactions abroad:
“What is most pathetic about Japan’s contribution such as the dispatch of maritime
SDFs is that among Japanese politicians and bureaucrats, the main issue has been
how such a dispatch would be reacted to.  In other words, how Japan’s activities
would be reacted to by the United States.  This has been discussed openly in Japan.
If the SDFs have been dispatched for the maintenance of the US-Japan alliance, it is
natural that the reaction to such a dispatch will become an issue.  However, the
persistent principle has been ‘We must fight terrorism!’ and Japan has dispatched
its SDFs among moral anger about terrorism and on the basis of its determination
not to tolerate terrorism.  In that case why does it talk about ‘reactions’ publicly?” 63)
Fukuda also complains about the lack of mental preparation for a potential crisis,
implying that strategy and morality are inseparable:
“I would like to emphasize my despair particularly about the fact that Japan has not
at all changed in the ten years that have passed since the Gulf Crisis.  Last year on
September 11 this became obvious.  There had been no kind of reflection about
what to do, how to react to a potential crisis.  At the same time, Japan had also
neglected to think about what values it should adopt and what priorities it should
set.  I already mentioned that a long-term strategy and a moral sense are closely
associated.” 64)
This statement shows that even in Independentist circles, who have traditionally
attached great significance to strategic thinking as a means of asserting the national
interest effectively, the idea is spreading that a plainly Realist strategic approach may
not be feasible any longer.  One has to note, however, that moral sense is seen as an
inevitable concept for the pursuit of national interest, i.e. it is nothing but a functional
concept; it is not adopted for the sake of morality as a principle like in the Pacifist or
Multilateralist discourse.  In this sense the overall Independentist approach has not
changed fundamentally, but has only been modified in order to ensure popular appeal
and practical validity as well as efficiency in a period that has been marked by
transition, redefinition and fluidity.
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Pacifists (平和主義者)
The Pacifist group is essentially made up of center-left and radical left politicians
and academics, some of who proudly look back on their past as anti-establishment
demonstrators on various occasions, for example the opposition against Japan’s
Security Treaty with the United States in 1960.  This is why the Pacifist debate is
commonly tinged with a subtly rebellious, anti-American and humanitarian nuance.
It is self-evident that this group envisions Japan’s ideal international contribution to be
of an exclusively non-military nature.65) Therefore, they are distinctly alarmist about
what they consider a recent rise of militarism in Japan.  Having a strongly idealist
background, Pacifists attach high value to principles.  While they enjoyed continued
popularity throughout the 1990s, their influence in the wake of September 11
decreased.  The recent shifts in Japanese domestic policy with the landslide victory of
Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the general elections in September 2005
resulted in another weakening of what remained of the pacifist left in Japanese
politics.
Unease about Japan’s excessive dependence on the United States
Essentially opposing Japan’s maintenance of its alliance with the US, it comes as no
surprise that in the Pacifist debate after September 11 there is a continued anti-
American tone and latent unease about the fact that analogous to the Gulf crisis, the
Japanese government has appeared to be invisibly monitored by Washington.
According to Sakamoto Kazuya,
“It is obvious to everyone that the reaction [to September 11] of the Japanese
government so far has been restrained by consideration for the United States,
something that could be described as the Gulf War syndrome.  Behind this is
Japan’s feeling of humiliation about the fact that its US$130 billion ‘international
contribution’ was not appreciated.” 66)
Pacifists typically express their opposition to Japan’s uncritical subservience to the
United States, arguing that this will, in the long term, negatively influence Japan’s
relations with Asia, another priority in the Pacifist debate:
“Toeing the line with the United States decision to wage a war and joining that war
is presently Japan’s military and defence strategy.  It is the peculiar logic of the
Japanese government that establishing a state framework which will legitimise such
a strategy and making arrangements so that there is broad consensus about carrying
out military operations will contribute to ‘peace and stability’ in the Asian-Pacific
region.” 67)
Concern about lack of ideals
Closely related to anti-American sentiment in the Pacifist debate is their concern
about Japan’s lack of ideals, values and principles.  Since one of the predominant
paradigms among Pacifists has been the respect of principles for their moral validity
(as opposed to the respect of principles as a functional concept in the Independentist
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debate), they have expressed their unease about the lack of principles in the actions
taken by the Japanese government in the post-September 11th world.
Japan’s hurried willingness to support the United States has been interpreted as a
sign of Japan’s ultimate weakness in terms of international ranking: behind the actions
of the Japanese government has been the lingering fear of negative implications for its
ranking among powers in the international system, should it be reluctant to offer a
non-financial contribution:
“This time it was clear that the United States, which have the capabilities to carry
out military operations by themselves, did not need Japan’s military cooperation.
Why did Japan decide to dispatch SDFs for the support of the United States then?
First, those young bureaucrats and chiefs of bureaus who experienced the
humiliation of the Gulf War, are now in the very centre of power and influence in
the government as leaders or ambassadors and have been repeating the phrase
‘Don’t forget about the Gulf!’  These people have made it the highest priority to
pass the grading test as an alliance partner by the United States, and to that aim
they feel that they need to put together a new menu of offers to the US and then
rush off quickly.” 68)
Members of this group like to point out that the mentality of wide circles in the
Japanese bureaucracy, namely that a military contribution by Japan will be
appreciated by the international community, is outdated, criticising Japan’s lack of
backbone in the face of demands about its international contribution.
“First of all, I think the underlying thought that Japan’s actions this time will be
appreciated internationally is a strange one.  We have been influenced heavily by
the Gulf War shock and as a result decided to show our flag, but will this be
appreciated abroad?  I think the chances are high that nobody will expect such
behaviour on the part of Japan.  The conception that a military presence will be
highly evaluated by the international community is per se anachronistic.” 69)
The Pacifists’ underlying aversion to ‘force’ and anything to do with ‘military’ and
their equation of ‘pro-American’ with ‘anti-Asian’ is evident from the following
remark:
“Strengthening ‘force,’ strengthening ‘military power,’ strengthening the ‘Japanese-
US security framework’ is Prime Minister Koizumi’s way of encountering people in
the Asia-Pacific region.  We think that this stance is fundamentally mistaken.  We
must not become victims of war, nor must we become assailants in war.  Above all,
we must be bystanders, cautiously watching over developments in contemporary
politics.” 70)
Alarmism about rising militarism
Closely related to the above-described opposition by the Pacifists against Japan
making an international contribution that exceeds non-military aspects is their
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prevalent concern in the Pacifist debate about what they perceive as a rising threat of
militarism.  More specifically, they fear that the catchphrase of Japan’s “international
contribution” might be abused for nationalist militarist purposes.
“There have been a lot of provisions (in the anti-terrorism law) that seem like a
rewritten version of the PKO Cooperation Law or the Regional Contingency Law
on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, but this is only to cover up those parts
that have been changed.  In the anti-terrorism law the area of activity has, for the
first time, been expanded to include ‘foreign territory.’  In the Regional
Contingency Law operations by SDFs were required if there was a situation in
areas surrounding Japan that would have an important influence on the peace or
security of Japan; therefore, the area of activity was still confined to Japan.  The
new law now is a huge jump from those stipulations.  It provides for a substantial
change of the basic character of SDFs.” 71)
The recent Pacifist debate over the last few months has seen growing fear that
centre-rightists and extreme right-wingers could use Japan’s obsession of not losing
face on this occasion in order to assert their controversial contingency legislation.
“One must not think that contingency legislation is something that every country
had better establish.  Such legislation could become the basis for Japan’s
metamorphosis into a military power which uses classic warfare for the purpose of
threat.  The take-off for a nation that uses military power has already started.” 72)
This is just one example of the distinctly alarmist tone that has characterized the
Pacifist debate.  Since for generations, Japan’s war-renunciation clause has constituted
nothing less than their raison d’être, Japan’s recent moves towards a different
interpretation of the exercise of the right of collective self-defence comes as a
conspicuous danger in Pacifist eyes.
“The occurrence of the terrorist attacks in the United States in September has come
as a golden opportunity for those who want to remove the restrictions of pacifism,
human rights and democracy from the constitution, revive the military and
‘emergency cases’ and turn Japan into a ‘normal country.’” 73)
Ex-diplomat Amaki Naoto states that Japan’s decision to dispatch SDF to Iraq lacks
credibility arguing that if this decision was taken because of consideration for the
United States, it is too subservient.  According to Amaki, if it is based on the belief
that it was right to do so and this conviction was founded upon a feeling of self-
deception for reasons of self-protection, it is too pathetic.74)
Fear of Polarisation
Another issue in the recent Pacifist debate has been their concern about growing
insecurity and polarisation as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States
Pacifists like to point out that
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“citizens are not only worried about how to react in case they were involved in a
terrorist attack, but that there is a more comprehensive process of rethinking the
meaning of politics and this could be a cause of the above-mentioned insecurity.
Traditional politics took national borders as a precondition; (…) issues were
confined to national territories.  The fact that this is no longer valid has caused
insecurity.  (…)  Furthermore, awareness has grown about the fact that within one’s
country’s borders there are a lot of weird people, this has been an element of
insecurity.  The fact that different people live side by side per se does not represent
a problem nor is it unusual.  Moreover, terrorism is an issue for all of us and is not
an issue of a certain group only.  However, when an incident occurs like the one on
September 11, the mentality grows among us that ‘We do not do things like that,
only they would do something like that;’ people start to look for some scapegoat to
identify the origins of evil with.” 75)
At the same time, however, Pacifists also claim that the growing interdependence of
nations has the positive side-effect of making the needs of developing countries more
conspicuous to the industrialized world.76)
Generally one can say that the Pacifist debate has traditionally taken up the North-
South gap as an issue, emphasizing Japan’s moral responsibility as an industrialized
country to support developing countries.
Pragmatic Mutilateralists (多国間主義者)
The last group that I will present in this paper is the youngest one in this matrix.
Emerging after the end of the Cold War, the Pragmatic Multilateralists saw a distinct
increase in number and influence within the Japanese debate in the mid-1990s.  Due
to a number of domestic and external factors their authority lost momentum in the
second half of the 1990s.  The September 11 incident has only contributed to this
development in the sense that it has given a new incentive to the Japanese debate to
reinforce the national security issue and the related issues of constitutional revision
and collective self-defence.  Subsequently concepts such as human rights, the
international public good or multilateral diplomacy have attracted less attention in the
recent national discourse.
Pragmatic Multilateralists emphasize the growing interdependence of the world and
therefore assess diplomacy at a multilateral level as highly effective.  Due to their
interpretation of post-Cold War politics as nothing but a crossboundary paradigm,
they claim that the “national interest” is more or less equivalent with the
“international public good.”  In that sense their views could clearly be categorized as a
perspective that is heavily indebted to Grotian thought.  They generally value variety
and difference, be it in foreign relations as such or identity issues.  In other words,
Pragmatic Multilateralists have indicated that they interpret Japan’s multi-faceted
identity in international politics as an asset rather than a burden.  Moreover, this
group has put high priority on transparency, accountability and humanity in
international politics.  However, compared to the Pacifists, they combine idealism
with a more down-to-earth, pragmatic approach.  This combination of belief in and
adherence to principles and pragmatism may be due to the fact that a large part of this
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group is made up of relatively young scholars.
Advocating variety as strategy
As mentioned above, Pragmatic Multilateralists advocate variety as a strategy in
foreign relations; they claim that in the post-September 11 world, Japan’s diplomatic
priorities have simplified on the one hand because the fight against terror has risen to
the top of its agenda.  On the other hand, however, they believe that complexity with
regard to the structure, actors and their interplay in international politics has steadily
grown.77) This group therefore concludes that the diversification of international
relations as such has led to the decrease in significance of the state as an operational
unit and the emergence of transnational enterprises and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) as global actors on the one hand, but has also given rise to
terrorist and other criminal networks having a great impact on the international
system.78) According to Pragmatic Multilateralists, the pursuit of multilateral
diplomacy combined with bilateral frameworks is the ideal option for Japan.  Since
they typically call for a balance between Japan’s alliance with the US and its foreign
relations with Asia, just to name two pillars, this group has criticised Japan’s hurried
support of the United States in the wake of the attacks, arguing that this could be
considered as a step back for Japan’s Asia diplomacy.79)
Funabashi Yo¯ichi calls for more balanced forms of cooperation in Japan’s foreign
relations, claiming that multilateral frameworks should receive higher priority.80)
Pragmatic Multilateralists tend to emphasize the importance of diversification in
Japan’s contribution this time: not only should Japan be willing to support the United
States in military terms but also information-wise.  Another recurring proposal in the
Multilateralist debate is that this crisis is an opportunity for Japan to deepen its
relations with South East Asia and India since in their eyes, effective anti-terrorist
measures will require a higher degree of regional cooperation in addition to Japan’s
traditional orientation on the United States.81) Moreover, they have pointed out the
redefinition of Japan’s foreign relations as an urgent task.  They have called for new
concepts in Japan’s diplomacy such as systematically combining multilateral activity
for example in the UN with Japan’s genuinely own regional diplomatic activities.
According to them, the threats posed by transnational terrorism cannot be tackled
effectively in the traditional bilateral mercantilist regional diplomacy or in the context
of Japan’s security alliance with the United States.82)
Humanity as a parameter of international influence
Another prevalent argument in the Pragmatic Multilateralist debate since
September 11 has been basic agreement to Tokyo’s decision to dispatch SDFs into the
Indian Ocean, but doubts about the acceptability of the government’s reaction
immediately after the attacks:
“It is clear now that the reaction of the Japanese government to the September 11
Incident was indeed problematic.  First of all, to start with the details, there is the
issue why the Japanese government and the Japanese people did not issue a
representative and exact message.  One has to admit that when the incident
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occurred, it was midnight in Japan but one has to say that the fact that we were
only worried about the fate of Japanese exiles was inappropriate.” 83)
What is more, Multilateralists claim that this lack of human concern is bound to
lead to Japan’s eventual marginalisation from the international community.  They
have interpreted the fact that in the immediate wake of the attacks, the Japanese
government and people were only worried about their countrymen there as a sign of
deficient international solidarity.84)
Since Pragmatic Multilateralists envision the world as a mutually dependent entity,
they call for international solidarity for both ethical as well as strategic reasons.  A
frequent feature in the Pragmatic Multilateralist discourse is the call for an
“international security community.”  Watanabe Hirotaka pleads for Japan to show
confident views in foreign affairs as is deemed appropriate for the world’s second
largest economic power.  Japan should make suggestions and act for international
society as such.  According to Watanabe, if Japan thinks about aiming to get a
permanent seat in the UN Security Council, the most important thing would be that
Japan acquires an awareness of an “international security community” (国際安全保障
共同体) as a basis for its values and actions.85) At the same time, however, they like to
point out the importance of a healthy amount of self-confidence on the part of Japan
vis-à-vis its neighbours.  Kitaoka Shin’ichi comments for example that with regard to
Japan’s ambition to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council some people
take the view that Japan is not qualified for this role since it needs to obtain the
agreement by its neighbours which it cannot expect due to its lack of coming to terms
with its past.  Kitaoka, however, argues that support by Japan’s surrounding countries
is certainly important but also points out that relations between neighbours are not
always amicable.86) Contrary to Kitaoka, Funabashi emphasizes that
“as long as the lack of trust in Asia towards Japan will not be overcome, the theory
about the ‘lid on the bin’ will in fact still be valid.  At the same time, Japanese
citizens also feel suspicious about ‘Japan.’  As is typical of the criticism directed
towards the bureaucrats in the 1990s, throughout the ‘lost 1990s,’ the public
continued to look at the political classes (politicians and bureaucrats) with strict
eyes.  Now that we have entered an age in which the self-defence forces get really
going, we need to have a thorough discussion about the extent to which politics is
credible to the citizens.” 87)
Funabashi also points out that Japan’s coming to terms with its past is essential for
the sake of keeping the countries’ long-term national interests, arguing that
constructing relations of trust with its neighbouring countries is an important issue and
that actively tackling historical issues by showing a serious attitude is a prerequisite.88)
On the other hand, Kitaoka points out that if one refers to the dispatch of self-
defence forces, there are people who will inevitably talk about the fear in Asia, but
this time [the decision by the Japanese government to dispatch self-defence forces to
Iraq] the Philippines (which is grappling with problems of terrorism within the
country) and Thailand which is sending armed forces to Iraq) have actively spoken
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highly of Japan.  […]  And China and South Korea who usually react most severely
only expressed their hope that Japan will not depart from its policy of strictly
defensive national defense.  According to Kitaoka, this constituted a great success
from the point of view of assessment by the international society. 89)
As described above, concepts such as “interdependence” and “human concern”
feature high on the Pragmatic Multilateralist agenda.  Therefore, this group has from
the very outset expressed its support for Japan’s joining the United States in its
revenge war on the Taliban regime.  In contrast to Independentists, however, they
explain this by the fact that Japan has also been affected by the terrorist attacks.
Rather than considering domestic elements (such as the potential linking of
contingency legislation with this crisis), they point to interdependence as the decisive
factor that makes Japan’s participation inevitable in the wake of the September 11
incident.  According to Tanaka Akihiko,
“The war against terror this time, the international politics related to it and plans
after the war, these are all matters that are without any doubt related to Japan in
some way or another.  This is not about whether the United States will appreciate
Japan’s actions sufficiently or not.  An active role for Japan in all aspects is
desirable.” 90)
In a similar vein, Watanabe Hirotaka, professor at Tokyo University of Foreign
Studies, wonders whether
“it is appropriate for Japan to limit itself to merely providing backup logistic and
financial support to United States diplomacy.  This will lead to Japanese diplomacy
per se being questioned.  The aim of diplomatic acts by one country is not only to
maintain amicable relations with the major powers.  What is more important is how
it is going to demonstrate its national prestige to other countries and how it is going
to make its existence perceptible.” 91)
The same concern has been referred to by Funabashi Yo¯ichi, criticising that the
term “international contribution” has been used this time rather than “international
solidarity.”  Funabashi also points out that as a long-term participant in the war
against terrorism, Japan should be aware of the dangers that come with that role,
calling for Japan to mobilize diplomacy, economics, its alliance with the United States
as well as the UN, police as well as SDFs in a campaign that encompasses many fields
and frameworks.92)
Criticism of Government’s Ambiguity on National Defence Issues
Transparency and confidence-building have been among the essential ideals in the
Pragmatic Multilateralist debate.  Therefore, this group has also continued to call for
transparency in the Japanese government’s reaction to the September 11 incident.
Above all, Multilateralists have vehemently criticized the government’s wilful
ambiguity about national security issues.  They have pointed out the lingering
confusion about the precise definition of the terrorist attacks, namely whether they
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constitute a war or not in terms of international law.
Against this background Multilateralists call for an effective and constructive debate
on what role Japan should play after the war and make arrangements for participating
in an international framework against terrorism.93) Murata Ko¯ji claims that there is no
international order that does not rely on military power.  He points out that it is
necessary to calmly analyze Japanese security from the point of view of international
politics.94) According to Murata,
“Even if one aims to construct an international order with a low level of reliance on
military force, one needs to resign at heart to the fact that an international order
which does not rely on military force at all is not feasible.  Making something
impossible one’s aim is not idealism.  This amounts to abandoning realistic thought
and only results in the spreading of a feeling of powerlessness.” 95)
At the same time, however, Murata also points out that it is important for Japan to
keep a realistic awareness of the limits of its influence.  Similarly, Kitaoka Shin’ichi
proposes to enlarge Japan’s international contribution gradually.  He argues that
Japan will eventually evolve into a country which fulfils a military role to some degree
and due to the change in scope and contents of the activities carried out by the UN
Security Council, the weight of Japan’s activities will grow, Japan’s financial
contribution will also increase further.96) Kitaoka also maintains that the use of
collective self-defence is essential for Japan’s international contribution,
“Article 9 Paragraph 1 rejects the use of military force in order to settle conflicts,
but it does not reject self-defence.  The resolution of conflicts here refers to the
settlement of conflicts between Japan and other countries.  Therefore one can take
the interpretation that in order to solve international conflicts, it is not forbidden to
dispatch the SDF.  If one does not at least change the view held by the government
that the exercise of the right of collective self-defence is inappropriate, so that Japan
can play an important role in the fight against terror, this will become a great
restriction.” 97)
Miyazawa Kiichi similarly calls for a greater sense of reality when discussing the
dispatch of Japanese SDF,
“At the end of last year, right in the midst of the debate whether to dispatch
Japanese self-defense forces or not, there were several unforeseen fatalities among
Japanese diplomats.  I am not siding with those who claim that therefore, Japan
should stop sending forces, but we need to be well aware of the fact that it is such a
dangerous place and country where there is nothing surprising about battles
breaking out at any time.” 98)
Miyazawa also condemns the lack of independence in thought with regard to
decisions on Japan’s foreign policy,
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“I do understand Koizumi’s emphasis on Japan’s alliance with the United States,
and in some way it may be natural that we are carrying out measures based on the
special law on Iraq.  However, we have our own constitution.  This is nothing
striking of course, but action which conflicts with it, cannot be permitted even if it is
for the sake of our ally for example.  In this regard, the discussion is getting
ambiguous.” 99)
Outline of Views Held by Each School of Thought on Self-Perception, National Security,
International Society
I will now summarize the main ideas of each school of thought in the proposed
matrix, outlining the different perceptions of “self,” “national security” and
“international society” that have emerged in the precedent process of analysis.  If one
chose to take a bird view of the above-mentioned groups within Japan’s national
discourse, it is surely no mistake to claim that there have been a number of
remarkable changes going on over the last few years with regard to Japan’s national
security, more specifically, how it perceives itself and its international role.  Public
support has grown noticeably to dispatch Japanese SDFs abroad; the notion of Japan
as a freerider in international security has been questioned as an appropriate means of
ensuring Japan’s national security while a sense of need for Japan to contribute more
actively to international affairs also in military terms has grown proportionately.
These facts, however, have been interpreted in a different manner by each group.
Subsequently, the way each school of thought perceives “self ” as well as how it relates
“self ” to “alter,” i.e. international society, also varies considerably.  If one thinks of the
different paradigms and perspectives of each group, it seems natural and inevitable
that the emerging images of self-perception, national interest and national security
differ so much.
The Centrist debate illustrates the continued struggle of this group to combine
tradition and change.  On the one hand, members of this group still hold a strong
belief in the notions of “winning or losing,” in other words, they continue to think in
terms of zero-sum game.  As a result, they seem to apply ambiguity as a means of
strategy, if not very efficiently.  On the other hand, they are aware of the need to
review their principles and ideas.  This inherent contradiction has produced palpable
insecurity and tension within the group.
As regards the Centrist self-perception, they commonly perceive themselves as
cautious and calculating participants in a strategic game; since they are, however,
aware of stronger forces superior to themselves, they have been reduced to what
essentially amounts to a reactive case-by-case response rather than pursuing a strategy
based on a genuine vision.
The Centrist definition of national security is rather vague since this group has
struggled to define its priorities clearly.  A review of the Centrist debate suggests,
however, that they continue to perceive national security in strongly Realist terms;
furthermore, they tend to refer to something equivalent to a regime, some regulative
force superieure.  Their remarks commonly point to their awareness of a constraining
institution in the neo-liberal sense.
Concerning the Centrist definition of international society, they typically see the
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international level as a challenge of their national interests, i.e. they tend to see the
two levels in dichotomised terms.  Since Centrists are bound to be reactive due to
their essential features of cautiousness and awareness of external regulative
mechanisms, it emerges that they ultimately do not see international society as an
equal paradigm to the national level but as superior and therefore threatening.  In
other words, international society poses an inherent danger in their eyes.  To sum up,
“international society” constitutes an externally regulative norm with constraining
function; Centrists are therefore affected to some degree by it, but are not
constitutively shaped by it.
The Independentist Group continues to emphasize concepts such as “national
interest,” “power,” and, as its name implies, “independence.”  The terrorist attacks on
the US have been perceived as a golden opportunity by Independentists to push their
nationalist cause.  The debate among this group in the wake of 9/11 shows that the
attacks have brought new momentum into the discussion about constitutional
revision, expansion of Japan’s military role, redefinition of “collective self-defence”
and the like.  In other words, Independentists have managed to link Japan’s
“international contribution” to the expansion of Japan’s military role and the option of
revising Japan’s postwar pacifism.  Ironically, despite the rallies for independence and
maturity of this group, the axis around which Independentist thought essentially
revolves is the alliance with the US and, more generally, US perception of Japan.
Since this group, like the Centrists, tend to view international politics as a zero-sum
game, they are constantly concerned about loss of power and resulting
marginalisation.  This is why they have called insistently for the abolition of Japan’s
pacifist tradition.  They typically express concern about potential terrorist attacks on
Japan.
Independentist self-perception could be described as follows: Independentists like
to conceive themselves as self-confident, independent players in a strategic game full
of traps, in which deception is seen as a legitimate means of tactic.  The discourse of
this group in the past few years has shown a tendency to formulate their cause in
polemic and increasingly aggressive terms.  In this aspect, they are considerably
different from Centrists, who mostly respond reactively.
As regards the Independentist view of international society, it essentially constitutes
a strategic toy for states to help them assert their national interest.  This attitude has
clearly surfaced in their perception of the 9/11 incident as a golden opportunity to
push through controversial legislation for the dispatch of Japanese SDFs abroad.  In
other words, like the Centrists, they see national interest and international public good
in dichotomised terms; Independentists, however, commonly make an active effort to
use international society for the assertion of their own interests.  Centrists, in contrast,
are reduced to passively reacting to the international level.  As a result, international
society represents a regulative norm in the classical systemic sense for Independentists
(even if they do not approve of it), but is in no way constitutive in the sense that it
would contribute to the shaping of their interests and preferences.
The Pacifist Group stands for pacifist idealism combined with social concerns.
Since pacifism represents the raison d’être of this group, Pacifists have tended to
express their alarmism about what they perceive as rising militarism.  Not
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surprisingly, they have expressed their opposition to the linking of “international
contribution” with the issue of constitutional revision.  In the Pacifist discourse the
alarmism of this group occasionally results in descriptions of right-wingers as effective
conspirators whose aim it is to wrench a reversion to totalitarian militarism on Japan.
Besides, Pacifists are concerned about increasing polarisation within society as a result
of the terrorist incidents.  This points to their underlying social consciousness, a
traditional Pacifist feature.
As regards Pacifist self-perception, they like to conceive themselves as morally
credible actors with responsibility to change the system to the better.  They tend to
dismiss everything that is related to the military in some way as anachronistic and
inherently evil.  Moral judgment plays a predominant role in the Pacifist debate, even
more so since the terrorist attacks.  Thus, according to the Pacifist view, Japan can
pursue its national interest most effectively by engaging in multilateral diplomacy,
reinforcing its relations with Asian countries.
The Pacifist view of international society could be summarized as follows:
“international society” is seen as a notion with strong ethical implications; they regard
it as an arena where industrialized nations fulfil their obligation of supporting
developing countries with the ultimate aim of achieving a more balanced distribution
of wealth and influence.  In other words, Pacifists regard international society as an
inherently ideational paradigm; it therefore incorporates a constitutive norm for this
group.
The Pragmatic Multilatelateralist Group has been associated with concepts such as
“transparency,” “mature responsibility,” “multilateral cooperation,” discourse as
dispute settlement and open variety.  They are the most progressive group in the
sense that they mostly equate “national interest” with the “public international good.”
Like the Pacifists, they show an inclination to emphasize ethics in international society
but their vision of international cooperation being more comprehensive, they do not
necessarily oppose military means of dispute settlement.  It needs to be stated clearly,
however, that they generally do not advocate classical warfare in the Hobbesian
tradition.  What has characterised the Multilateralist debate in the wake of the
September 11 incident is their notable emphasis on humanity as a parameter of
international influence.  In other words, they assume that in the world of increasingly
complex and interrelated global politics, ideational paradigms such as “humanity”
equate and ensure influence at the international level.
The Multilateralist self-perception is essentially as follows: Multilateralists tend to
envision themselves as morally credible mediators with an internationalist
perspective, who function most effectively in a multilateral context.  In addition, they
highlight the significance of intangible ideational factors such as “identity,” suggesting
that states actively bring in their genuine identities into the pursuit of international
relations.  Multilateralists have expressed concern about Japan’s marginalisation in the
wake of the terrorist attacks on the US; unlike the Independentists or Centrists,
however, they are not so concerned about the resulting loss of national power, but
about the implications such a marginalisation would have on the state’s capability to
act multilaterally and thus express solidarity at the international level.
In the Pragmatic Multilateralist discourse the “national interest” is commonly
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identified as intricately linked with issues of international society.  They like to hold
the view that the pursuit of national interests only makes sense if the interests of other
countries are taken into consideration.  This is also why they consider Japan’s coming
to terms with its past as essential for the pursuit of its long-term national interests.
As shown above, “international society” is interpreted in the Multilateralist debate
as being more or less equivalent with national concerns.  This is why Multilateralists
have shown overwhelming support of Japan’s dispatch of SDFs to Afghanistan from
the very outset.  From among the four groups in the preceding matrix, Multilateralists
come closest to constructivist thought.  They see international and national society as
inseparably linked and mutually constitutive.  Non-tangible ideational factors are
given priority over material factors.  This also matches assumptions within the
constructivist framework.
Conclusion
The aim of this study has been to give a survey of the developments in Japan’s
national debate between 2001 and 2005 about the definition of its international
contribution and position, more specifically implications of the 9/11 incident.  I have
made an attempt to elucidate reasons for the major changes in national security
perception that have recently occurred in Japan.  Furthermore, I have tried to
demonstrate the inherent link between the national and the international level with
regard to identity definition and preference formation.  This study has shown that in
the discourses of all groups of thought in Japan’s national debate, some connection
between the two domains has been conceded, if in varying ways.  Due to their
Hobbesian heritage, Centrists and Independentists perceive international society as a
merely regulative norm; in contrast, for Pacifists and Pragmatic Multilateralists
international society represents a constitutive norm in the sense that they have
internalized elements of international society to different degrees.  While Centrists
have recently been less eloquent in the national debate, Independentists have
experienced a boost in morale due to general rightist tendencies in Japan.  Pacifists
have expressed their cause more vehemently, but it remains doubtful whether they
can retain their traditional postwar influence.  The Pragmatic Multilateralist discourse
continues to be vivid, but in general, their appeal seems to have decreased compared
to the Independentists.  Compared to the 1990s, they have become more pragmatic
and less idealist.
I have also made an effort to demonstrate the enduring impact constructivist
thought has exerted on Japan’s national debate; two of the four schools that I have
defined have evidently been influenced constitutively by ideational factors, the most
distinctive feature of constructivism.  This is why it can be assumed that at least in the
short and mid term future, non-material paradigms will continue to be of essential
importance in understanding and interpreting Japan’s perception of itself, its identity
and its national security.  However, against the background of increasing military
instability throughout East Asia, it does not come as a surprise that Independentist
voices have gained weight since 2001.  While representatives of all groups of thought
except the Centrists are critical of Japan’s excessive reliance on the United States in
security issues, no concrete alternative scenario has been proposed.
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